Quantum secret sharing schemes encrypting a quantum state into a multipartite entangled state are treated. The lower bound on the dimension of each share given by Gottesman ͓Phys. Rev. A 61, 042311 ͑2000͔͒ is revisited based on a relation between the reversibility of quantum operations and the Holevo information. We also propose a threshold ramp quantum secret sharing scheme and evaluate its coding efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes were studied by several authors ͓1-5͔ as quantum counterparts of classical secret sharing ͑SS͒ schemes ͓6,7͔. QSS schemes are methods to encrypt an arbitrary quantum state or classical message into a multipartite entangled state among several quantum systems-namely, shares-in the following way: each of shares has no information about the original state or message while it can be reproduced by collecting several shares. QSS schemes can be classified into two categories based on what is encrypted-i.e., quantum states ͓3-5͔ or classical messages ͓1,2͔. In this paper, we treat only the QSS schemes encrypting quantum states, which we call just QSS schemes for simplicity.
In the literature on QSS schemes in this sense, the ͑k , n͒-threshold QSS scheme was proposed by Cleve et al. ͓3͔. In the ͑k , n͒-threshold QSS scheme, an arbitrary quantum state is encoded into n shares so that any k out of n shares can reproduce the original state while any k − 1 or less shares have no information about it. Recently, experimental demonstrations ͓8,9͔ of the threshold scheme were reported. After the work of Cleve et al., Gottesman ͓4͔ demonstrated that any general access structure consistent with the monotonicity ͓10͔ and the no cloning theorem ͓11-15͔ can be realized by a QSS scheme. The same result was shown by Smith ͓5͔ independently by using monotone span programs. Gottesman ͓4͔ also analyzed the coding efficiency of QSS schemes and showed that the dimension of each share must be the same or larger than that of the original system.
In this paper, we revisit the coding efficiency of QSS schemes in an information theoretical manner. First, we establish a relation between the reversibility of quantum operations and the Holevo information ͓16͔ in a general setting rather than QSS schemes. This relation is a natural extension of the idea in the classical information theory that the sufficient statistic is characterized by the preservation of the mutual information ͓17͔. In classical statistical inferences, the sufficient statistic has several equivalent characterizations ͓18͔: the existence of reverse channels, the preservation of information quantities such as the relative entropy, and the factorization theorem. On the other hand, the reversibility of quantum operations was studied by several authors ͓19-21͔ related to the quantum error correcting code ͓22,23͔, while it was also studied in terms of sufficiency in the field of the operator algebra ͓24-30͔ ͑see also Refs. ͓31,32͔͒.
Recently, Petz and his colleagues ͓33,34͔ have established a theory of sufficiency in the quantum setting that is characterized by the reversibility of quantum operations ͑or coarsegrainings͒, the preservation of information quantities, and the quantum version ͓35,36͔ of the factorization theorem. Our characterization of the reversibility falls into a natural variant of theirs. However, we rather use the term reversibility in this paper for the reasons that the characterization is closely related to the literature in the quantum error correcting code and that the notion of sufficiency is not yet so clear in quantum statistical inferences such as the quantum estimation theory ͓37-39͔ and quantum hypothesis testing ͓37,39-42͔.
Second, returning to QSS schemes, we utilize the characterization of the reversibility to evaluate a kind of information that each share has about the original quantum state, and then the evaluation leads to the lower bound on the dimension of each share given by Gottesman ͓4͔. It should be noted 1 that a similar result on the dimension of each share has been given in Ref. ͓43͔ by a different method using the reference system relevant to the coherent information ͓21͔.
As mentioned above, it is impossible to reduce the dimension of each share than that of the original system in QSS schemes which have perfect security conditions. Here, the perfect security conditions mean that any set of shares can either reproduce the original state or obtain no information about it, and such schemes are called perfect QSS schemes. On the other hand, in classical ramp SS schemes ͓44,45͔, the *Electronic address: ogawa@mist.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp size of each share can be decreased by the sacrifice of security conditions admitting the intermediate property for some sets of shares. Following these classical counterparts, we propose a ramp QSS scheme and analyze the coding efficiency of it. Then, it is shown that the dimension of each share can be reduced than that of the original system by the sacrifice of security conditions like the classical ramp schemes. Finally, we also demonstrate an optimal construction of the ramp QSS scheme.
II. DEFINITIONS
Let H , J , K be finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and let L͑H͒ and S͑H͒ be the totalities of linear operators and density operators on a Hilbert space H, respectively. We will treat QSS schemes encrypting a quantum state on H into a composite system of Hilbert spaces is called a ramp scheme. Although the terms "authorized" and "unauthorized" are used in the previous works ͓3,4͔ on perfect QSS schemes, we use the terms "qualified" and "forbidden" in this paper because we must divide "unauthorized" sets between "intermediate" sets and "forbidden" sets in ramp QSS schemes.
III. ACCESS STRUCTURE
The access structure of a QSS scheme is the list of forbidden, intermediate, and qualified sets. In classical ramp secret sharing schemes ͓44,45͔, intermediate sets are classified further into multilevel categories based on the conditional entropy. In ramp QSS schemes, however, we do not classify the intermediate sets for simplicity in this paper. Formally, the access structure of the set N is defined by a map f :2 N → ͕0,1,2͖, where 0, 1, and 2 indicate forbidden, intermediate, and qualified sets, respectively. For a QSS scheme W N , the access structure of N is determined naturally and hence, is called the access structure of W N . It is clear that the access structure of W N satisfies the monotonicity-i.e., X ʕ Y ⇒ f͑X͒ ഛ f͑Y͒. In addition to this relation, the restriction due to the no cloning theorem ͓11-15͔ ͑see also proposition 3 in the appendix ͒ is imposed on QSS schemes; that is, the complement of a qualified set is necessarily forbidden. Conversely, it was shown in Refs. ͓4,5͔ that any perfect access structure, consistent with the monotonicity and the nocloning theorem, can be realized by a perfect QSS scheme.
A quantum operation E is called a pure state channel if E͑͒ is a pure state for any pure state . A QSS scheme W N is called a pure state scheme if it is a pure state channel. Otherwise, it is called a mixed state scheme. Gottesman ͓4͔ showed that any perfect QSS scheme is regarded as a subsystem of a pure state QSS scheme. The following lemma is a slight extension of his result including ramp QSS schemes.
Lemma 1. Any mixed state QSS scheme W N is realized by discarding one share from a pure state QSS scheme W N Ј . Moreover, the access structure of W N Ј is determined uniquely by that of W N .
Proof. From the Stinespring dilation theorem ͓46͔, there exists a Hilbert space H Z and an isometry V :
Let NЈ = N ഫ Z; then W N is realized from the pure state QSS scheme W N Ј ͑͒ = VV * by discarding one share Z. We note that the access structure of W N Ј for a set X ʕ N not including Z is the same as that of W N . Hence we will consider the access structure of W N Ј for X ʕ NЈ which includes Z. It follows from proposition 3 in the appendix that X is qualified iff NЈ \ X is forbidden and, equivalently, that X is forbidden iff NЈ \ X is qualified. Furthermore, we can also see that X is intermediate iff NЈ \ X is intermediate. Therefore, the access structure f͑X͒ is determined uniquely by the complement NЈ \ X ʕ N.ᮀ
IV. REVERSIBILITY AND HOLEVO INFORMATION
In this section, turning to a general setting, we will demonstrate that the Holevo information ͓16͔ is closely related to the reversibility of quantum operations.
For , S͑J͒, let
be the quantum relative entropy. Then, for any quantum operation E : S͑J͒ →S͑K͒, it yields the monotonicity ͓47-49͔, i.e.,
and the equality holds iff E is reversible w.r.t. ͕ , ͖ ͓29͔ ͑see also Refs. ͓31,32͔͒. Furthermore, in the case of equality, there is a canonical reverse operation depending only on , which is given by
Here E * : L͑K͒ →L͑J͒ is the dual of E satisfying
The above fact is summarized as the following proposition. Proposition 1 (Petz [29] ; see also Refs. [31, 32] ). Given a quantum operation E : S͑J͒ → S͑K͒ and , S͑J͒, let R be the quantum operation defined by Eq. ͑4͒. Then the following three conditions are equivalent.
͑a͒
͑c͒ E is reversible w.r.t. ͕ , ͖. This fact can be easily extended to a general relation between the Holevo information and the reversibility of a quantum operation w.r.t. a subset S ʕ S͑J͒. Let P͑S͒ be the set of probability measures on S ʕ S͑J͒, and let
be the expectation by a probability measure P͑S͒. Given an ensemble P͑S͒ and a quantum operation E, the Holevo information is defined by
where def = E ͓͔ and H͑͒ def = −Tr͓ log ͔ is the von Neumann entropy. Moreover, let P + ͑S͒ be the set of probability measures on S ʕ S͑J͒ which are positive almost everywhere on S. More specifically,
where O͑S͒ is the totality of open sets on S and is defined in terms of the relative topology induced by the inclusion S ʕ S͑J͒. Then we have the following theorem. Theorem 1. Let I : S͑J͒ →S͑J͒ be the identity map. Given a quantum operation E : S͑J͒ →S͑K͒ and S ʕ S͑J͒, the following three conditions are equivalent.
͑a͒ E is reversible ͑vanishing͒ w.r.t. S.
From the definition of the reversibility, there exists a quantum operation R such that ∀ S , R · E͑͒ = . Taking the expectation of by an arbitrary P + ͑S͒, we have R · E͑ ͒ = . Then it follows from "͑c͒ ⇒ ͑a͒" of proposition 1 that
Taking the expectation of the above equality by leads to ͑b͒. ͑b͒ ⇒ ͑c͒: Obvious. ͑c͒ ⇒ ͑a͒: First, note that
since the monotonicity of the quantum relative entropy leads to
for each term in the expectation of ͑9͒. Therefore we can see from the definition of P + ͑S͒, along with the continuity of E and the quantum relative entropy that Eq. ͑8͒ is a necessary condition for I͑ ; I͒ − I͑ ; E͒ = 0. Using "͑a͒ ⇒ ͑b͒" of proposition 1, we have that ∀ S , R · E͑͒ = , which implies ͑a͒.
As for the vanishing property, we can show the assertion in the same way as the reversibility by using D͑ ʈ ͒ ജ 0 and D͑ ʈ ͒ =0⇔ = .
ᮀ
V. CODING EFFICIENCY OF QSS SCHEMES
Let S 1 ͑H͒ be the totality of pure states on H, and note that a quantum operation is reversible ͑resp. vanishing͒ w.r.t. S͑H͒ iff it is reversible ͑vanishing͒ w.r.t. S 1 ͑H͒. Therefore it suffices to treat the reversibility of a QSS scheme W N w.r.t. S 1 ͑H͒. For a pure state ensemble P + (S 1 ͑H͒), the Holevo information is given by I͑ ; I͒ = H͑ ͒, since H͑͒ = 0 for any pure state S 1 ͑H͒, and hence, the following theorem immediately follows from theorem 1.
Theorem 2. For any QSS scheme W N , the following three conditions are equivalent.
͑a͒ X is qualified ͑forbidden͒. ͑b͒ ∀ P + (S 1 ͑H͒) , I͑ ; W X ͒ = H͑ ͒͑=0͒. ͑c͒ ∃ P + (S 1 ͑H͒) , I͑ ; W X ͒ = H͑ ͒͑=0͒. Remark 2. Theorem 2 can be regarded as a variant of the perfect error correcting condition ͓21͔ without using reference systems, while theorem 1 is an extension of these conditions to the reversibility condition w.r.t. general subsets of S͑H͒.
Remark 3. As is clear by definition, it is also interesting to observe from theorem 2 that the access structure of QSS schemes does not depend on in P + (S 1 ͑H͒). We note that this fact holds in classical perfect SS schemes. Actually, corresponding statements are given by a different approach in Ref. ͓50͔ . Now we consider the coding efficiency of QSS schemes.
Theorem 3. For any significant set X ʕ N of any QSS scheme W N , it holds that
Proof. From lemma 1, W N is supposed to be a pure state scheme without loss of generality. Moreover, for any significant set X ʕ N we can choose a forbidden sets Y ʕ N such that X ഫ Y is qualified and X പ Y = Ø. Then it holds that I͑ ; W XY ͒ = H͑ ͒ and I͑ ; W Y ͒ = 0 for any P + (S 1 ͑H͒) from theorem 2, and hence, we have
where the last inequality follows from the subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy and we have written the conditional entropy as 
which has been asserted. ᮀ Corollary 1 (Gottesman [4] ). For any significant share i N of any QSS scheme W N , we have
Proof. Let be the uniform distribution on S 1 ͑H͒ in theorem 3-namely, the invariant measure with respect to the special unitary group. Then we have = I / dim H and the dimension of each share is bounded below as
ᮀ Remark 4. The arguments and the theorems so far are valid even in the classical cases. That is verified by replacing the corresponding notions with the classical ones. For example, quantum operations, the Holevo information, and pure states are replaced with channels, the mutual information, and ␦ distributions, respectively. In this case, it should be noted that the proof of theorem 3 is already finished in ͑12͒, since the conditional entropy is nonnegative in the classical cases.
VI. RAMP QSS SCHEMES
From corollary 1, it is impossible to reduce the dimension of each share than that of the original system in perfect QSS schemes, since any share except useless ones should be significant in perfect QSS schemes. On the other hand, in classical ramp SS schemes such as ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp SS schemes ͓44,45͔, the size of each share can be decreased by taking into account the trade-off between the security condition and the coding efficiency. We utilize this idea in the quantum setting to propose ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp QSS schemes in the following sense. Definition 1. A QSS scheme W N is called a ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp QSS scheme if the following conditions are fulfilled.
the ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp QSS scheme reduces to the ͑k , n͒-threshold QSS scheme ͓3͔ if L =1.
Cleve et al. ͓3͔ showed that the condition n ഛ 2k − 1 must be satisfied for the ͑k , n͒-threshold QSS scheme to exist. As an extension of this condition, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For a ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp QSS scheme, it holds that n ഛ 2k − L. Especially, we have n =2k − L if it is a pure state QSS scheme.
Proof. From definition 1, X is a qualified set if ͉X͉ = k. In this case, it follows from proposition 3 in the Appendix that the complement N \ X is forbidden, which implies
In the case of a pure state QSS scheme, we can also show that n ജ 2k − L in the same way.
Similarly to theorem 3 and corollary 1, we can evaluate the coding efficiency of the ramp scheme as follows.
Theorem 4. For ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp QSS schemes, it holds that
Proof. For any set X ʕ N with the cardinality ͉X͉ = L, there exists Y ʕ N such that X പ Y = Ø and ͉Y͉ = k − L. Then X ഫ Y is qualified while Y is forbidden. Therefore it follows from theorem 3 that
where we used the subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy. Finally we can show ͑18͒ by taking the arithmetic mean of ͑19͒ for all
The above corollary implies that the dimension of each share can be decreased by the factor 1 / L in the average sense than that of the original system.
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF RAMP SCHEMES
In this section, we will show a method to realize ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp QSS schemes which has the optimal coding efficiency in the sense of corollary 2. The encoding and reverse operations used here are regarded as extensions of Ref. ͓3͔ to the ramp QSS scheme.
Let F be a finite field with q def = ͉F͉ ജ n, and let J j ͑j =1,… , L͒ and H i ͑i N = ͕1,… , n͖͒ be isomorphic Hilbert spaces with dimension dim J j = dim H i = q and an orthonormal basis ͕͉s͖͘ sF indexed by F. We will construct a pure 
on H. For this purpose, we utilize the polynomial of degree k −1 on F specified by coefficients c = ͑c
By providing publicly revealed constants x 1 , … , x n F which are different from each other, define the isometry V by
where
and C is a normalization constant to be specified later. Now, in order to verify that V is actually an isometry, let us introduce the following notations for
Then we have p c ͑X͒ = ͑c 1 , … , c k ͒M k−1 0 ͑X͒, and the following lemma is useful for later discussions.
Proof. The injective property is verified by the following relation:
In the same way, we can show the remaining part of the lemma. ᮀ From the above lemma, we can see that ͉p c ͑N͒͑͘c F k ͒ are orthogonal to each other, and hence, V͉s L ͑͘s L F L ͒ are also orthogonal to each other, which ensures that V is isometric. At the same time, the normalizing constant is deter-
Next, we will show that thus constructed QSS scheme W N is actually a ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp scheme.
a. Qualified sets. In order to verify that X is qualified for ͉X͉ ജ k, it suffices to show that X = ͕1,… , k͖ is qualified, because of the symmetrical way to construct W N and the monotonicity of the access structure. The following local operations on X realize the reverse operation of W X .
͑i͒ Perform the unitary transformation on X corresponding to p c ͑X͒M k−1 0 ͑X͒ −1 , which turns the summation in ͑23͒ into
͑ii͒ Noting that n − k = k − L, perform the unitary transformation on X corresponding to the linear transformation:
which can be represented by lemma 3 as
Therefore it follows from proposition 3 in the appendix that X is forbidden.
c. Intermediate sets. In the case ͉X͉ = k − l͑0 Ͻ l Ͻ L͒, we show that X is intermediate. For this purpose, it is sufficient to show that for X = ͕1,… , k − l͖ , W X is neither reversible nor vanishing w.r.
Taking theorem 2 into account, let us calculate the Holevo information
and H͑ ͒ for the uniform distribution on S. Then the von Neumann entropy is easily calculated as H͑ ͒ = L log q since = I / q L . On the other hand, from lemma 3 and
Lemma 3 with 
where the third and last equalities follow from lemma 3. Then we have
Therefore it follows from theorem 2 that W X is neither reversible nor vanishing w.r.t. S.
At last, it is confirmed that W N actually realizes the ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp scheme. It is clear from the construction of W N that the coding efficiency of W N is optimal in the sense of corollary 2.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have revisited the lower bound on the dimension of each share in QSS schemes given by Gottesman ͓4͔ and gave a rigorous proof for the lower bound ͑theo-rem 3 and corollary 1͒. The key idea of the proof was as follows. First, we have established a fundamental relation between the reversibility of quantum operations and the Holevo information ͑theorem 1͒. Then, we have treated the qualified or forbidden condition as the reversible or vanishing condition for the corresponding quantum operation. These steps gave us clear insights into QSS schemes and even into classical SS schemes ͑see remark 4͒. For example, we can easily see from these pictures that the qualified or forbidden condition is independent of the probability of the source ensemble in both classical and quantum cases ͑remark 3͒.
We have also proposed a ramp QSS scheme called the ͑k , L , n͒-threshold QSS ramp scheme so that the dimension of each share could be decreased than that of the original system by the sacrifice of security conditions. Finally, we have analyzed the coding efficiency of the ͑k , L , n͒-threshold ramp scheme and shown an optimal construction to attain the lower bound on the efficiency.
One may wonder that a forbidden party with the forbidden set of shares could disturb the protocol in QSS schemes by using the property of the entanglement. In other words, what happens if the forbidden party would try to break the protocol to measure their particles and to announce the outcome publicly?
The answer of the question is as follows. Let X ʕ N be a qualified set for a QSS scheme W N . Then, Y def = N \ X is forbidden and there exists a decoding operation R X for X recovering any pure state from W N ͑͒:
where I Y is the identity map and 0 def = W Y ͑͒. Note that pure states have no entanglement with another systems and that 0 does not depend on . Then, we can see that Eq. ͑34͒ also holds for mixed states and that any malicious operation E Y by the forbidden party Y could not interfere with the qualified set of shares-i.e.,
However, the above arguments are not valid for intermediate sets of shares; i.e., a measurement on an intermediate set of shares may affect the quantum state of another intermediate set through the effects of the entanglement. For this reason, it is a challenging problem to classify intermediate sets in ramp QSS schemes. We need to study security conditions for ramp QSS schemes and to develop tools to quantify the information that an intermediate set of share has. These developments are left to further studies.
APPENDIX: NO-CLONING AND NO-DELETING THEOREM
In this paper, we have used a fundamental result in QSS schemes shown by that is, if a set of shares X ʕ N is qualified, the complement N \ X is necessarily forbidden, and, in addition, the converse is also true in pure state QSS schemes. These properties are regarded as variants of the no cloning theorem ͓11-15͔ and the no deleting theorem ͓51,52͔. Another proof of this property relevant to the no-cloning theorem is given by an information theoretical manner in Ref. ͓43͔ . In this appendix , we will review these results in our notations for readers' convenience following the original proof ͓3͔ which utilizes the perfect error correcting condition ͓19,20͔. Here we introduce a notation E ϳ͕E a ͖ a by which we mean that E is a quantum operation represented by the Kraus representation ͓53͔ E͑͒ = ͚ a E a E a * . Proposition 2 ([19,20] ). Let C : S͑H͒ ‫ۋ‬ VV * S͑J͒ be a quantum operation defined by an isometry V : H→J, and let E : S͑J͒ →S͑K͒ be a quantum operation represented by E ϳ͕E a ͖ a . Then the following conditions are equivalent.
͑a͒ E · C is reversible w.r. 
